09 March, 2026

The CPX Threat Intel team (FalconWatch) has identified a large-scale QR‑code phishing (“quishing”) campaign targeting multiple organizations and sectors. The activity is characterized by highly repeatable URL construction, business‑themed lures, and infrastructure consistent with phishing‑as‑a‑service (PhaaS) operations.
The campaign leverages QR codes embedded in email attachments to redirect victims to fake Microsoft 365 authentication portals, where credentials and authenticated sessions are harvested.

Figure 1: QR-code in email attachment
Evidence indicates the reuse of standardized phishing templates, automated victim tracking, and Cloudflare‑fronted infrastructure designed to evade traditional defenses and hinder sandbox analysis.

Figure 2: Sample 1: Credential harvesting page

Figure 3: Sample 2: Credential harvesting page
The campaign is assessed to be operated via the FlowerStorm phishing‑as‑a‑service (PhaaS) platform, which provides built‑in Adversary‑in‑the‑Middle (AiTM) capabilities. This enables attackers to intercept authentication sessions in real time, capture credentials, and bypass multi‑factor authentication (MFA), resulting in persistent account compromise across affected tenants.
The campaign relies on business‑plausible, high‑urgency themes designed to trigger fast action. Apart from the usual lures applied in the email body and subject, the analysis of subdomains shows a clear pattern of same enterprise‑process impersonation, where attackers deliberately use terms associated with Microsoft 365 services, HR and payroll workflows, document sharing, security, and internal administration.
These subdomains often use long concatenated phrases, generic internal‑system naming, and intentional misspellings, which both mimic real SaaS or vendor portals and help evade simple keyword or brand‑based detection.
Psychologically, they exploit employee expectations that such actions are normal business tasks, reducing suspicion and increasing click‑through rates, while operationally allowing attackers to reuse the same naming conventions across many domains to scale campaigns and blend malicious infrastructure into everyday enterprise web traffic.
Phishing URL construction pattern
Across multiple domains, CPX observed a canonical phishing URL structure:
|
https://<lure_subdomain>.<domain>.<tld>/<5‑character token>/?e=<victim_email> |
High‑signal indicators
This repeatability strongly indicates campaign automation, rather than bespoke phishing pages per target.
Campaign automation and tracking
By keeping the landing page constant and varying only the ?e= parameter, operators can:
This operational model aligns with known PhaaS ecosystems targeting Microsoft 365 environments. The CPX Threat Intel team assesses with moderate to high confidence that this activity is either FlowerStorm‑based or operated by a closely related PhaaS ecosystem reusing similar tooling.
Microsoft Defender hunting for QR-code derived URLs
|
1 // Look for QR-code sourced URLs containing the distinct ?e= pattern 2 EmailUrlInfo 3 | where UrlLocation == "QRCode" 4 | where Url has "?e=" 5 | where Url matches regex @"\/[A-Za-z0-9]{5}\/\?e=" |
These controls directly reduce exposure to QR‑based AiTM phishing campaigns.
The following domains were identified as active infrastructure associated with this campaign.
|
Type |
Value |
|
Domain |
onedrivesalaryassessment[.]digitaltrustbase[.]de |
|
Domain |
work[.]dim[.]com[.]de |
|
Domain |
workorder[.]dim[.]com[.]de |
|
Domain |
secure[.]directandclear[.]de |
|
Domain |
agrreeementt[.]powerfulpresence[.]de |
|
Domain |
secure[.]innovativewege[.]de |
|
Domain |
reviewed[.]innovativewege[.]de |
|
Domain |
login[.]whisperingwater[.]de |
|
Domain |
welahaavagcafghj[.]interfaceswithmeaning[.]de |
|
Domain |
staff__update__2026_[.]clarityfirstdigital[.]de |
|
Domain |
m365fileshare[.]hourlychimes[.]de |
|
Domain |
lordhelpme[.]directandclear[.]de |
|
Domain |
___staff_update_2026_[.]clarityfirstdigital[.]de |
|
Domain |
aqusjf[.]simplelayout[.]de |
|
Domain |
staff_update_2026[.]efficiencystrength[.]de |
|
Domain |
depthumanresources[.]notebooksanddreams[.]de |
|
Domain |
__staff_update[.]clarityfirstdigital[.]de |
|
Domain |
adobe[.]notebooksanddreams[.]de |
|
Domain |
mail[.]whispersofhope[.]de |
|
Domain |
humandeptnotifications[.]notebooksanddreams[.]de |
|
Domain |
secured[.]innovativewege[.]de |
|
Domain |
review[.]innovativewege[.]de |
|
Domain |
hajasshshsushshmmm365docpdf[.]professionalidentityhub[.]de |
|
Domain |
humaneresourcesbenefit[.]notebooksanddreams[.]de |
|
Domain |
officemahost[.]tuesdays[.]com[.]de |
|
Domain |
outlookonline[.]bagsoffernweh[.]de |
|
Domain |
humanresourcesnotification[.]notebooksanddreams[.]de |
|
Domain |
hrdepartiment[.]notebooksanddreams[.]de |
|
Domain |
readyaccess[.]morningraindrops[.]de |
|
Domain |
drives[.]whisperingwater[.]de |
|
Domain |
enrolls[.]whisperingwater[.]de |
|
Domain |
humanresourcesdepartment[.]notebooksanddreams[.]de |
|
Domain |
staff_update_2026[.]clarityfirstdigital[.]de |
|
Domain |
othersystemdoc[.]flickered[.]com[.]de |
|
Domain |
booksss[.]federaltechlaw[.]co[.]uk |
|
Domain |
count[.]innovativewege[.]de |
|
Domain |
yaoff[.]hourclock[.]de |
|
Domain |
meetingapprovedinvitaiondeadline[.]breathingnight[.]de |
|
Domain |
auth[.]bagsoffernweh[.]de |
|
Domain |
staff_changes_for_2026[.]clarityfirstdigital[.]de |
|
Domain |
drive[.]whisperingwater[.]de |
|
Domain |
addoc-click[.]securecommonoauth2v20authorize[.]com |
|
Domain |
office[.]whisperingwater[.]de |
|
Domain |
hr_adjustment_records[.]clarityfirstdigital[.]de |
|
Domain |
payrollfeedback[.]digitaltrustbase[.]de |
|
Domain |
safesitte[.]innovativewege[.]de |
|
Domain |
faxfileshareddocxofflcedocuments[.]barebonesweb[.]de |
|
Domain |
hr_adjustment_record[.]clarityfirstdigital[.]de |
Our team continuously tracks emerging phishing, credential theft, and adversary infrastructure trends affecting enterprise environments. This blog is intended to support detection engineering, incident response, and strategic risk reduction.